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It has been sixty years since the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education,1 yet schools in some states remain racially divided, and the debate
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown held that the segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race deprives them of equal educational opportunities and violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 494–95.
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over affirmative action continues. Previously, the contest over affirmative
action centered on whether remedying past discrimination2 and diversifying
student populations in schools were compelling justifications for using racial
classifications.3 The Court has found both purposes compelling.4
After Grutter v. Bollinger,5 in which the Court held that race may be
implemented as a “plus factor” in higher education admissions practices in
order to attain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse study body,6
schools began implementing complex admissions criteria that take an
applicant’s race into consideration. Colleges and universities in Texas
responded to Grutter by resuming the use of race in their admissions
procedures, a practice the schools previously eliminated.7 The University of
Texas at Austin (UT Austin) maintained dual admissions policies: the raceneutral “Texas Top Ten Percent Plan,” and a different race-based policy that
considered race as one of many factors.8
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,9 Abigail Fisher, a white applicant
denied admission under the race-based policy, challenged the University’s
continued use of race in making admissions decisions when a race-neutral
alternative, the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan, already produced a diverse
student body.10 Fisher argued that the University’s race-based admissions
policy was no longer necessary to achieve diversity and, thus, the University
no longer had a compelling interest to justify using race as a consideration for
admission.11 In a show of deference to the University, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the program.12 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Fifth Circuit
2. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 496–97 (1989) (distinguishing
the goal of remedying a government actor’s past discrimination from the impermissible goal of
remedying general societal discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276,
280 (1986) (differentiating between societal discrimination, which is impermissibly vague, and a
narrowly tailored program that remedies the effects of prior discrimination); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1977) (finding that a state has a legitimate interest in
remedying identified discrimination, but not “societal discrimination”).
3. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that attaining the
educational benefits of diversity is a compelling government interest).
4. See, e.g., id. at 329 (finding that a diverse student body is a compelling reason to
consider race in state university admissions decisions); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (holding that
diversity is a compelling reason for considering race in college admissions decisions).
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. Id. at 334.
7. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013).
8. Id. at 2416.
9. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
10. Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013).
12. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
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incorrectly applied strict scrutiny when it deferred to the University. 13 The
Court insisted that the lower court must rigorously scrutinize whether a school
has proven that no workable race-neutral alternatives exist in order to show
that its race-based program is necessary, and therefore, narrowly tailored.14
The purpose of this Article is to explore the available race-neutral options
that colleges and universities can use to achieve diversity and whether,
following Fisher’s mandate, schools must consider those alternatives. To that
end, Part I of this Article notes that the emphasis of the Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence has changed, and that the pivotal issue is now whether an
institution’s affirmative action program is narrowly tailored.
The question of whether a program is narrowly tailored is now refined, after
Fisher, to an inquiry of whether there are race-neutral alternatives that will
work “about as well”15 as racial affirmative action. Fisher shifts the
affirmative action discussion from the normative issue of whether schools
should consider race as a factor, to the doctrinal question of whether there are
workable race-neutral alternatives. Now, a school must prove there are no
workable race-neutral alternatives in order to use race-based affirmative action.
The next frontier in affirmative action litigation will focus on how much
diversity is sufficient to conclude that a race-neutral alternative is workable
and which race-neutral alternatives schools must consider. Part I addresses
those questions and argues that there are many race-neutral alternatives with
demonstrated success that higher education institutions must consider before
they can implement an admissions policy that uses race as a factor.16
Part II discusses the race-neutral alternatives available to higher education
institutions, including percentage plans; class-based affirmative action; the
elimination of legacy and development admissions acceptances; universitybased recruitment, retention, and financial aid plans;17 and community

13. Id. at 2421.
14. Id. at 2420–21. Throughout this Article, the term “narrowly tailored” is intended to also
encompass the requirement of showing necessity.
15. Id. at 2420 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
16. This Article does not focus on whether there is a greater imperative to achieve the
objectives underlying a particular race-neutral alternative, such as socioeconomic diversity over
racial diversity. Rather, this Article explores the impact of Fisher on affirmative action programs
in higher education and whether Fisher mandates race-neutral alternatives, such as
socioeconomic affirmative action or percentage plans, and whether those alternatives work as
well as race-based programs. Thus, if any discussion about comparisons between race-neutral
and race-based programs can be construed as favoring a race-neutral program, it should be
understood as resulting from doctrinal analysis—not from a normative assessment.
17. Institutions should also consider implementating recruitment, retention, and financial aid
programs that will increase diversity. Constitutionally speaking, institutions may engage in race-
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outreach.18 In fact, some universities have already explored the viability of
race-neutral percentage plans and class-based admissions policies.19 A
comparison of the levels of diversity in California, Texas, and Florida when
race was a component of admissions policies to levels of diversity when racial
admissions were eliminated shows that percentage plans are effective.20 Even
at those states’ premier universities, underrepresented minority enrollment
reached, or even exceeded, the levels from when racial bans were in effect.21
Class-based plans focus on the socioeconomic status of applicants in
recognition that a student’s socioeconomic status is highly correlated with

conscious policies that treat everyone fairly. For example, Justice Kennedy previously opined
that fair race-conscious procedures are permissible:
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all
of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the
problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Therefore, in order to retain
minority students, institutions may target low-income neighborhoods or high schools during
recruiting, provide substantial financial aid to low-income students, and offer counseling and
additional academic assistance to students from underperforming high schools.
18. Community outreach programs, such as partnering with K-12 schools, mentoring,
providing summer programs and Boot Camps, enhancing teacher education, increasing Advance
Placement courses, and initiating science-based reading practices help children from
underrepresented communities and low-performing schools gain college admission. U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 5 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACHIEVING DIVERSITY], available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edliteraceneutral
report2.html.
19. See infra Part II.A–B.
20. See GARY M. LAVERGNE & BRUCE WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE
TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN:
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS FALL 2003, ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF TOP 10% AND NON-TOP
10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEARS 1996-2002 3–4 (2003) [hereinafter LAVERGNE & WALKER,
IMPLEMENTATION], available at http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588Report6-part1.pdf (discussing diversity levels at Texas attributable to the Texas Top Ten Percent
Plan); THE UNIV. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF STUDENTS
AND STAFF: FALL 2012 27 tbl.7k (2012) [hereinafter UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY:
FALL
2012],
available
at
http://legacyits.ucop.edu/uwnews/stat/statsum/fall2012/statsumm2012.pdf (illustrating enrollment numbers by
ethnicity, gender, and academic level); infra note 101 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
Florida universities admitted more minority students when a percentage plan was in place).
21. See, e.g., Bruce Walker & Gary Lavergne, Affirmative Action and Percent Plans: What
We Learned in Texas, COLL. BOARD REV., May 2001, at 18, 20 [hereinafter Walker & Lavergne,
What We Learned in Texas] (noting that UT Austin regained pre-racial admissions ban diversity
levels).
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school and test performance.22
Schools that implement class-based
affirmative action demonstrate that giving a boost to economically
disadvantaged applicants increases the level of diversity compared to the
diversity level race-based affirmative action creates.23 The benefits of classbased admission programs are that they change our perspective on how to view
deservedness and address the problem of structural mobility for the
impoverished.
Institutions need not implement these plans, but at a minimum, they should
be required to articulate to a court why these plans would not work “about as
well” as race-based admissions policies. Schools subjected to the rigorous
judicial scrutiny required by Fisher will have difficulty rejecting, for example,
percentage plans and class-based affirmative action without identifying the
school’s unique circumstances that would limit the feasibility of these
alternatives.
Relatedly, schools focused on attaining diversity must eliminate legacy and
development admissions. Policies allowing preferences for legacy and
development applicants are not per se unconstitutional.24 But when coupled
with race-based affirmative action, these preferences cannot be justified.
Studies reveal that legacy and development applicants are overwhelmingly
white and come from privileged families. Therefore, those preferences reduce
a school’s level of diversity.25 Even if these privileged admissions represent a
small percentage of all admissions, a school must prove to a court that it
considered workable, race-neutral steps to increase diversity before it can
justifiably rely on racial admissions. This logically entails eliminating policies
that work against diversity.26 Thus, colleges and universities must choose

22. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Reflections on Richard Sander’s Class in American Legal
Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 719, 724 (2011) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Reflections] (citing
Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access is Increasing Inequality,
and What to Do About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING LOW-INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED
IN COLLEGE 71, 173 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) [hereinafter Carnevale & Strohl,
Increasing College Access]) (noting that researchers have found “most of the predictors of low
SAT scores are socioeconomic in nature”).
23. Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity,
7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 392 (2013).
24. Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those
Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private
Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51, 52 & n.3 (2009).
25. Richard Kahlenberg, Online Fisher Symposium: Race-Neutral Alternatives Work,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fishersymposium-race-neutral-alternatives-work/ [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives
Work].
26. Eliminating preferences for legacy applicants is feasible for universities because doing
so does not financially cripple a school. See Chad Coffman, Tara O’Neil, & Brian Starr, An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Legacy Preferences on Alumni Giving at Top Universities, in
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between implementing racial admissions policies and giving preferences to
legacy and development applicants.
Additionally, schools should implement university-based programs that
recruit and retain minorities and make higher education a financial possibility.
Further, colleges and universities should reach out beyond the school’s walls
into the community to build a pool of applicants prepared for undergraduate
and graduate education. The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence supports
the expectation that before schools resort to racial affirmative action, they will
take steps to reduce the financial barriers to higher education and to remedy the
problems that underlie minority access.27
Part III discusses that, in order for schools to follow Fisher’s instruction that
they must prove there are no workable race-neutral alternatives to
implementing a race-based admissions policy, schools must be transparent in
their admissions policies. Before a court is able to evaluate rigorously whether
a school’s racial admissions policy is narrowly tailored, schools must publicly
disclose the details of its policies, resources, and limitations.
In this regard, as discussed in Part IV, Fisher changed and clarified the
boundaries of academic freedom. In fact, Fisher limits academic freedom to a
school’s prerogative in choosing its educational mission. Although schools
may choose the methods by which to attain their missions, Fisher imposes
restraint on the chosen methods. Schools may no longer choose their manner
of operation without regard to narrow tailoring.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF “NARROW TAILORING”
The debate over affirmative action no longer centers on the justification for
race-based decision making.28 Rather, it focuses on whether racial actions are
narrowly tailored. Government actors using racial classifications must pass
strict scrutiny by showing that the classifications are “‘necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly tailored to that end.’”29 Most
racial classifications with a compelling purpose are defeated by the
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 101, 101
(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (studying the relationship between legacy admissions and
donations at the top 100 universities from 1998 to 2008); Richard D. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths about
Legacy Preferences in College Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 22, 2010,
http://chronicle.com/article/10-Myths-About-Legacy/124561/ [hereinafter Kahlenberg, 10 Myths]
(characterizing the idea that “[l]egacy preferences are a necessary evil” as a myth).
27. See infra Part II.D–E.
28. The Court has recognized two interests as compelling justifications for using racial
classifications: the remedy of past discrimination caused by the actor and the attainment of a
diverse student body in higher education. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007).
29. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005)).
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necessity/narrowly tailored requirement.30 Therefore, the meaning of narrowly
tailored is the critical question.
Before a court may deem a race-based concept narrowly tailored, the
government must engage in “truly individualized consideration” in which race
is used “in a flexible, non-mechanical way.”31 The mandate for individualized
consideration necessarily prohibits putting racial groups on separate tracks and
insulating them from competition.32 Thus, individualized consideration cannot
be performed through the use of quotas.33 In Regents of University of
California v. Bakke,34 the Court invalidated the University of California at
Davis (UC Davis) Medical School’s admissions program that reserved 16 out
of 100 seats for minorities in each entering class.35 The rigid quota did not
afford each applicant individualized consideration whereby the school could
assess how the applicant’s unique qualities and abilities would contribute to the
student body and educational setting.36 Similarly, in Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co.,37 the Court held that Richmond’s practice of setting aside thirty percent of
city construction contracts for minority business enterprises was not narrowly
tailored.38 Quotas, such as those in Bakke and Croson, are inconsistent with
the narrow tailoring requirement because they do not allow competition on
equal footing.39
Additionally, an automatic distribution of points to a candidate because the
candidate is a minority does not meet the requirement of individualized
decision making when those points are decisive. In Gratz v. Bollinger,40 the
Court invalidated the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions
policy because it awarded twenty points to every underrepresented minority
applicant simply because of his or her race.41 Because the twenty points

30. Eang L. Ngov, When “the Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 535, 539 (2011) (“It is said that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact,’ but a
review of the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny is fatal
because of narrow tailoring.”).
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
35. Id. at 275.
36. See id. at 318 (suggesting that admissions programs that consider race as only one
among many admissions factors are not facially infirm).
37. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
38. Id. at 507–08.
39. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (noting that the quota insulated minority applicants from
comparison with other applicants).
40. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
41. Id. at 270.
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represented one-fifth of the points necessary for a guaranteed admission, race
played a decisive role in an applicant’s consideration.42 Although the
admissions office considered other “soft” variables, such as “leadership and
service, personal achievement, and geographic diversity,” the points awarded
for those variables were “capped” such that “[e]ven the most outstanding
national high school leader could never receive more than five points . . . .”43
In contrast to quotas and point allocations, narrow tailoring permits
consideration of race as a “plus” factor.44 In Grutter v. Bollinger,45 the Court
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s admission procedures, which
used race as a plus factor to enhance diversity, against an equal protection
challenge.46 Recognizing diversity as a compelling purpose,47 the Court noted
that the school’s policy neither defined diversity “solely in terms of racial or
ethnic status” nor restricted the manner in which an applicant could contribute
to the school’s diversity.48 The law school’s admission procedures were
narrowly tailored because race was not a decisive factor.49 By using race as a
plus factor, the policy was flexible, and each applicant received individualized
consideration.50
In addition to individualized consideration, narrow tailoring requires the
government to show that its reliance on racial classification is necessary to
achieve the government’s purported purpose.51 In order to prove necessity, the
government must show “serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives.”52 If a neutral approach can achieve the same objective
“about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,” then a race-based
approach is impermissible.53 In Croson, the Court criticized the city of
Richmond for not availing itself of race-neutral options to increase access to
the city’s contracting opportunities.54 Likewise, in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1,55 the school districts

42. See id.
43. Id. at 279.
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
46. Id. at 343.
47. Id. at 329.
48. Id. at 316.
49. Id. at 334.
50. Id.
51. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013)
52. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
53. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276, 280 n.6 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 509–10 (1989).
55. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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failed to consider race-neutral alternatives before using racial classifications to
assign students to schools.56
Thus, the burden of proving an admissions procedure is narrowly tailored
falls on the government.57 The Fisher Court made clear that although a court
may consider a school’s “experience and expertise in adopting or rejecting
certain admissions processes[,]” the school is not entitled to any deference on
the issue of narrow tailoring.58 In Fisher, an applicant to UT Austin
challenged the school’s use of race as one factor in determining admissions.59
The University maintained that the racial admissions procedures were
necessary because, although the student body as a whole was diverse, the
University lacked diversity in small classes consisting of five to twenty-four
students.60 The lower courts held that courts must provide substantial
deference to a school’s educational interest in defining diversity and whether
the school’s plan is narrowly tailored.61 The Supreme Court concluded that the
lower courts failed to apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny62 because a
University should not receive deference as to whether the means it chose were
narrowly tailored to its diversity goals.63 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that “[s]trict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a
school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way
without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works
in practice.”64 Thus, “strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate
burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available,
workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.”65
The effect of Fisher, for which Justice Kennedy urged in his earlier Grutter
dissent, is to “force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral
alternatives.”66
Although a school need not exhaust every possible
alternative,67 Fisher makes clear that the Court intends race to be “a last
resort.”68 The question that remains is what race-neutral alternatives are

56. Id. at 735.
57. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
58. Id. at 2420.
59. Id. at 2415.
60. Id. at 2416.
61. Id. at 2417.
62. Id. at 2415.
63. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
64. Id. at 2421.
65. Id. at 2420.
66. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 339.
68. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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“workable” and can achieve the benefits of diversity “about as well” as racial
affirmative action?
II. RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES
The requirement to consider race-neutral alternatives applies equally to
public and private institutions of higher education because “[v]irtually every
private college” receives federal funding, and thus, will be restrained by the
Supreme Court’s limitations on race-based programs.69
Satisfactory
alternatives are “polic[ies] that serve[] the same function as what [they]
replace[].”70 Race-neutral alternatives can include approaches that target an
admissions procedure itself; focus on other internal programs at an institution,
beyond the admissions procedure, that provide support to enable students to
succeed; or reach beyond the institution’s walls to broaden the pipeline of
applicants who are prepared for higher education.
A. High School Rank: Percentage Plans
1. A Retrospective of Percentage Plans
As discussed, one race-neutral option schools should explore before relying
on race-based admissions programs is a percentage plan, which admits students
solely on the basis of their class rank within their high school graduating class.
To date, Texas, California, and Florida have implemented percentage plans.71
Percentage plans have originated as a response to a court order, state
referendum, or executive branch initiative to prohibit race-based affirmative
action in higher education.72 Texas’s percentage plan was conceived in

69. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Diversity, 69 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 193, 195
(2012).
70. Richard Ford, Online Fisher Symposium: A Response to Richard Kahlenberg,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 17, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fishersymposium-a-response-to-richard-kahlenberg/. Professor Ford suggests that
socio-economic class is not “an alternative” to race-conscious affirmative action, but
instead a distinct policy that must be evaluated on its own merits . . . . Race- and classbased admissions policies are not “alternatives” in the sense of being mutually
exclusive or hydraulically related—the level of one rising as the other falls.
Id.
71. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation,
Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1818 (2004).
72. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
HARVARD UNIV., PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THREE
STATES’
EXPERIENCES
16–23
(2003),
available
at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-collegeadmissions-a-comparative-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf
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response to a court order. In Hopwood v. Texas,73 after four white students
challenged the admissions procedure of the University of Texas as violating
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit banned race-based admissions
programs.74 Consequently, a task force comprised of faculty from the Center
for Mexican-American Studies at the University of Texas and the University of
Houston, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund
answered State Senator Gonzolo Barrientos’s call to address the ramifications
of Hopwood.75 The task force’s work resulted in the Texas Top Ten Percent
Plan, which became effective in the fall of 1997.76 Texas’s percentage plan
guarantees admission into the student’s choice of public universities if a
student ranks within the top ten percent of her high school graduating class.77
In California, voters approved Proposition 209 (Prop. 209), also known as
the California Civil Rights Initiative, which amended California’s Constitution
to prohibit racial preferences in public employment, education, and
contracting.78 After the Supreme Court denied further appeal in 1997,79 Prop.
209 became effective for the fall 1998 entering class.80 In 1999, Governor
Gray Davis proposed a four percent plan similar to Texas’s percentage plan,
which became effective in fall 2001.81 California’s percentage plan, known as
the “Eligibility in Local Context,” guarantees admission to one of California’s
public universities to students ranking in the top four percent of their high
school graduating class.82
In Florida, the ban on racial preferences was a preemptive step that former
Governor Jeb Bush took in response to Ward Connerly’s efforts to initiate a
voter referendum in Florida.83 In 1999, by executive order, Governor Bush
implemented “One Florida,” which prohibited racial preferences in

(providing a history and detailing the mechanics of percentage plans in Texas, California, and
Florida).
73. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
74. See id. at 934 (holding that there was no justification for the school to “elevate some
races over others”).
75. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 16.
76. Id. at 16–17.
77. Id. at 17.
78. Id.; Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, A Brief History of Affirmative Action,
OEOD, http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter A Brief History
of Affirmative Action].
79. A Brief History of Affirmative Action, supra note 78.
80. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 17.
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id.
83. Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2000, at A1. See also HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 19 (noting that the Florida program
resembled California’s).
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employment, contracting, and education, but allowed race-conscious
scholarships, outreach, and summer programs.84 Governor Bush also
implemented the “Talented 20 Plan,” which guaranteed students ranking in the
top twenty percent of their graduating class admission into one of Florida’s
public colleges and universities, but not necessarily admission to the
applicant’s first choice.85 The Talented 20 program became effective for the
entering fall 2000 class.86
2. Percentage Plan Advantages and Disadvantages
Percentage plans succeed in creating a diverse student population. By
allowing each high school in the state to send its top ranked students to the
state’s public universities and colleges, percentage plans have greatly increased
geographic diversity.87 At UT Austin, for example, before Hopwood, the
entering class was comprised of graduates from 622 high schools, but half of
those students represented only sixty-four high schools.88 In 2013, the number
of high schools feeding into UT Austin increased to 1,102.89
Statistical evidence also shows that percentage plans have achieved
comparable levels of racial diversity as when race-based programs were in
place. When UT Austin revised its admissions program to exclude race and
include the Top Ten Percent Plan, the result was the most diverse entering
class in the school’s history.90 In 2003, the University of Texas’s incoming
class was comprised of sixteen percent Hispanics, compared with fourteen
percent pre-Hopwood.91 The percentage of African Americans enrolled

84. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 19.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Law:
A Test of the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis, J. HIGHER EDUC. 712, 713 (2006) (noting that “benefits
include greater geographic diversity of incoming students”).
88. DAVID MONTEJANO, ACCESS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AND THE TEN
PERCENT PLAN: A THREE-YEAR ASSESSMENT 1 (2006), available at http://www.utexas.edu/
student/admissions/research/montejanopaper.html.
89. WILLIAM POWERS JR., THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN: REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR, THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SB 175, 81ST LEGISLATURE, FOR THE PERIOD
ENDING FALL 2013 6, available at http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/SB_175_
Report_for_2013.pdf. This number is based on the admitted students, as opposed to the enrolled
students. See id. at 7.
90. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013); LAVERGNE & WALKER,
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3.
91. See LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 4. However,
increasing diversity in Texas’s statewide population may have contributed to the success of
Texas’s percentage plan. Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives Work, supra note 25.
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through the percentage plan in 2003 was equal to pre-Hopwood levels.92 Even
Texas’s flagship, UT Austin, regained its pre-Hopwood diversity levels by
1999.93 The University admits its percentage plan has been successful. The
University of Texas at Austin concedes that that the percentage plan produced
more students who were “the first in their families to attend college” than
holistic reviews that consider race.94 In 2008, eighty-one percent of students in
the University’s entering class were admitted through the percentage plan,95
which, as a testament to the percentage plan’s success, led the Texas
legislature to cap the number of Top Ten Percent students admitted to UT
Austin at seventy-five percent.96
Such evidence of the University of Texas’s success, achieved without
relying on race as a factor, makes it difficult for the University to argue that it
is necessary to implement raced-based programs because there are no workable
race-neutral alternatives. It also places the burden on other institutions to show
why a similar program would not work at their school.
In California, there were substantial increases in underrepresented minority
enrollment after Prop. 209 compared to prior enrollment numbers.97 The
following table aggregates data from the University of California’s admissions
reports and provides a side-by-side comparison of admission rates by ethnicity
in 199798 (before Prop. 209) and in 2012.99

92. LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3.
93. Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21.
94. In its brief, UT Austin stated,
And, in fact, admissions data show that African-American and Hispanic students
admitted through holistic review are, on average, more likely than their top 10%
counterparts to have attended an integrated high school; are less likely to be the first in
their families to attend college; tend to have more varied socioeconomic backgrounds;
and, on average, have higher SAT scores than their top-10% counterparts.
Brief for Respondents at 33–34 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
(emphasis added).
95. 11 OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, IMPLEMENTATION AND
RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
AT AUSTIN: DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF ENTERING FRESHMEN FALL 2008, ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE OF TOP 10% AND NON-TOP 10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEARS 2003-2007 9
tb1.2b (2008), available at https://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588Report11.pdf.
96. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 375; Intercultural Dev. Research Ass’n, Update on
Texas Top 10% Plan for Your Students, IDRA, http://www.idra.org/Education_Policy.htm/
Access_to_Higher_Education/Update_on_Texas_Top_10%_Plan_for_Your_Students_/
(last
visited Sept. 25, 2014).
97. See UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY: FALL 2012, supra note 20, at 27 tbl.7k.
98. Univ. of Cal., Statistical Summary of Students and Staff, U. CAL. OFFICE PRESIDENT,
http://legacy-its.ucop.edu/uwnews/stat/enrollment/enr1997/97sst7j.html (last updated Jan. 16,
1998).
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Table 1

American Indian
African American
Chicano/Chicana
Latino/Latina
Filipino/Pilipino
Chinese
Japanese
Korean
Other Asian
Pakistani/East
Indian/Other
White

Enrollment
for 1997
(before Prop.
209)
1,201
5,003
12,354
4,841
5,659
16,705
2,658
6,674
10,202

Enrollment
for 2012

Percentage
change in
enrollment

1,290
6,817
28,898
8,503
8,016
27,604
3,355
8,046
14,672

7.41%
36.26%
133.92%
75.65%
41.65%
65.24%
26.22%
20.56%
43.81%

5,621

7,444

32.43%

50,552

51,098

1.08%

Although it is difficult to determine whether the increase in minority
enrollment is due to population growth in California, the enrollment of whites
showed the lowest growth compared to underrepresented minorities from the
time its percentage plan went into effect.
Due to Florida’s Talented 20 program’s recent implementation and lack of
centralized data collection, limited data exists regarding Florida’s admission
rates.100 A search of the State University System of Florida shows the
following results, compiled from data aggregated through a customized search
using an interactive search tool:101
99. UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY: FALL 2012, supra note 20, at 27 tbl.7k.
100. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 44.
101. Fall Enrollment in State University System Institutions, ST. U. SYS. FLA. BOARD
GOVERNORS, http://www.flbog.edu/resources/iud/enrollment_search.php (select “2007” for Show
ten (10) years prior to and “ALL” for 2 digit CIP Code, then follow “continue” hyperlink; then
select “ALL” for 6 digit CIP Code and follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “ALL” for all
search queries and follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “ALL” for all search queries and
follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “Race”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) (displaying 20022011 fall enrollment data by race for the State University System of Florida).
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Table 2

Asian
Black
Hispanic
Native
American
NonRes
Alien
White
Pacific
Island
Multiple

Enrollment for
fall 1998
(before the
racial ban)

Enrollment
for fall 1999

Enrollment
for fall 2011

9,212
31,413
30,792

9,674
33,002
32,769

14,975
45,069
70,368

Percentage
change in
enrollment
from fall
1998 to
2011
62.56%
43.47%
128.53%

795

820

984

23.77%

8,506

9,635

13,784

62.05%

142,231

145,382

172,879

21.55%

0

0

472

0

0

5,581

As the table shows, the enrollment of minorities within Florida’s State
University System increased from the academic years beginning in fall 1998
and fall 1999, the years before the ban on racial preferences, to fall 2011.
Therefore, percentage plans in all three states regained or exceeded
underrepresented minority enrollment prior to the states’ ban on racial
admissions becoming effective.
Moreover, at the University of California, Berkeley (Berkeley) and the
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), underrepresented minority
enrollment either remained steady from pre-Prop. 209 levels or exceeded
diversity levels when racial admissions were used.102 A comparison of
enrollment at Berkeley in 1997 (the last year that schools used race-based
admissions) with enrollment rates in 1998 (the first year Prop. 209 became
effective) shows a drop in white enrollment from 35.2% to 29.2% and in Asian

102. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 36 tbl.12.
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enrollment from 40.9% to 37.1%.103 Hispanic enrollment at Berkeley
remained the same at 12.2%, while African American enrollment was
relatively stable, changing from 4.9% to 4.8%.104 Similarly, white enrollment
rates at UCLA dropped from 34% to 28.9%, and Asian enrollment fell from
41.3% to 37.2%.105 Similar to Berkeley, the enrollment for African Americans
and Hispanics at UCLA remained steady, changing from 4.9% to 4.3% and
from 13.9% to 13.6%, respectively.106 In 2001, four years after Prop. 209’s
implementation, white and Asian enrollment continued to decline at both
UCLA and Berkeley compared to 1997 (the year before Prop. 209 was
enacted), whereas African American enrollment remained steady, and Hispanic
enrollment increased.107 Comparatively, at the University of Florida, the levels
of diversity remained relatively stable between 2000, the year before Florida’s
ban on racial admissions, and 2001, when the ban was implemented.108 During
the same time frame at Florida State University, white enrollment dropped,
African American and Asian enrollments were steady, and Hispanic
enrollment increased by three percentage points.109 Percentage plans,
therefore, can attain the same level of diversity for underrepresented minorities
as race-based plans, even at premier institutions.
However, percentage plan critics question the efficacy of percentage plans at
achieving racial diversity at flagships schools.110 Some researchers point out
that “[i]n . . . premier institutions [in Florida], . . . whites and Asians were
overrepresented and blacks and Latinos highly underrepresented relative to the
15- to 19-year old population of the state.”111 They similarly note that at
UCLA and Berkeley, “blacks and Latinos [were] underrepresented relative to
the 15- to 19-year old population.”112
Any objection to a percentage plan based upon the premise that the levels of
diversity do not mirror the general population is irrelevant and

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 37 tbl.13.
109. Id.
110. The University of Texas at Austin, ranked fifty-second among the nation’s top colleges
and universities, and Texas A&M, ranked sixty-ninth, are Texas’s flagship universities. National
University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews.rankings
andreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/spp+50 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
Berkeley and UCLA are California’s premier institutions. Berkeley is ranked twentieth nationally
and UCLA is ranked twenty-third. Id. The University of Florida, ranked forty-ninth, and the
Florida State University, ranked ninety-first, are Florida’s flagship universities. Id.
111. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 36.
112. Id. at 35.
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unconstitutional. In order to obtain the educational benefits of diversity,
colleges and universities may aspire to attain a critical mass of minority
students. Critical mass is defined as the number of minorities needed to
“encourage[] underrepresented minority students to participate in the
classroom and not feel isolated.”113 Critical mass can be achieved, even when
diversity levels at the school do not reach levels similar to the general
population. As long as there is a critical mass of minorities, minorities can feel
engaged in the classroom without being among a student body as diverse as the
population.
Criticisms about the disparity between levels of diversity in the population
and the student body of a university imply that a program that results in student
diversity levels unequal to the population is unsuccessful.114 However, such a
call to reach population levels for underrepresented minorities borders on
insistence for racial balancing. Thus, designing admissions procedures for the
purpose of reflecting a population’s diversity would violate the Court’s
prohibition on racial balancing.115 In Croson, the Court invalidated a quota
because it was not narrowly tailored to any goal except racial balancing.116
The Court emphasized that it is “completely unrealistic” to expect that
“minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population.”117 It is similarly unrealistic that
minorities will enroll in a particular university in exact proportion to the state’s
minority population. As the Court previously stated,
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance,
rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of
diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under
our existing precedent. We have many times over reaffirmed that
“[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”118
Additionally, percentage plan opponents are concerned that students who
rank, for example, within the top ten percent, and thus are guaranteed
admission to a university, may not be as qualified as other students who attend
more academically challenging high schools but rank below the top ten percent

113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003).
114. See Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 372 (“The educational mission of colleges and
universities includes a commitment to prepare their graduates to lead in diverse workplaces in a
complex society. To effectively achieve this goal, schools must ensure that they serve a
population whose diversity bears some connection to the diversity of . . . society . . . .”).
115. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–30
(2007).
116. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 507 (1989).
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494
(1992)).
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of their class.119 A comparative analysis of the academic performance of
students admitted through a percentage plan to those admitted outside of the
plan, however, appears to rebut this presumption.120 In one study, researchers
found that the average freshman year GPA of students admitted to the
University of Texas outside of the percentage plan was 2.90, compared to 3.24
for students admitted through the percentage plan.121
Percentage plans that require students to take specific courses can also help
control the extent a student’s GPA and class rank are affected by the rigor of
the student’s course load. The University of California (UC) system, for
example, calculates GPA based on seven different subject areas, known as a-g
courses, and awards additional credit toward the GPA calculation for honors
and Advanced Placement courses.122 By requiring a-g courses, California’s
percentage plan removes the incentive for students to enroll in less challenging
high school courses. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it
exacerbates the socioeconomic disparity among schools. The fifteen required
college-prep courses considered in the UC system’s GPA calculation are less
likely to be available in schools located in disadvantaged neighborhoods.123
Notably, as a result of litigation, California recently sought to remedy the
disparate availability of college preparatory and advanced placement classes
among its high schools.124
Critics also argue that percentage plans fail to address the systemic racial
barriers facing minorities.125 However, percentage plans may offer an

119. See HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 18; Michelle Adams, Isn’t It Ironic? The Central
Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1731 (2001); Eboni S.
Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War?, 32 J.C.
& U.L. 1, 35 (2005).
120. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 35 (citing LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 20, at 3).
121. LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3.
122. Jennifer M. Chacón, Race as a Diagnostic Tool: Latinas/os and Higher Education in
California, Post 209, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1215, 1228 (2008).
123. Id.
124. See generally Alan E. Schoenfeld, Note, Challenging the Bounds of Education
Litigation: Castaneda v. Regents and Daniel v. California, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195 (2004)
(discussing the effects of two cases on equalizing educational resources, particularly college
preparatory and Advanced Placement courses, in disadvantaged schools). Texas and Florida offer
incentive programs to encourage schools to offer Advanced Placement courses. U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18, at 9. In Florida,
teachers receive a fifty dollar bonus for each student scoring three and above on Advanced
Placement exams, and $500 if they have at least one student in underperforming schools who
score three or higher. Id. The College Board observed that “Florida is now the leader in the
number of black students taking advanced placement courses.” Id.
125. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 119, at 1735, 1772 (discussing percentage plans’ failure to
address racial segregation).
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advantage beyond race-based programs that rely on traditional standards of
merit such as standardized test scores and GPAs. The advantage of percentage
plans is that they change the metric for determining merit from standardized
scores to long-term performance in high school. To some extent, percentage
plans equalize the opportunities for underrepresented minorities to compete for
college admissions by eliminating reliance on SAT and ACT performance.
The plans assure that students with GPAs and test scores that normally cannot
compete with the greater pool of applicants126 have the opportunity to attend
college because they compete in a smaller pool of applicants with the same
educational opportunities.127 Percentage plans open doors for students who
attend high schools in districts that are not feeder schools for colleges.128
A related criticism of percentage plans is that they do not serve students who
need it most.129 Percentage program critics are concerned about the
“creaming” effect; only the most affluent students will rise to the top, even
those students from disadvantaged schools.130 Princeton University Professor
Marta Tienda found that those accepted through the Texas Top Ten Percent
Plan would have been admitted without the program, and that the percentage
plan fails to help Hispanic and African American students graduating in the top
twenty percent and thirty percent of their class gain admission at Texas A&M
and UT Austin.131
Likewise, a study of Florida’s percentage plan found that a majority of the
students who benefitted from the program did not need it to gain admission

126. Studies show African Americans, Hispanics, and low-income students score the lowest
on those standardized tests. Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21, at
20.
127. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 37 (noting that percentage plans provide more
educational opportunities for minorities).
128. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Ledge,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1602 (2003).
129. C.f. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 452, 458 (1997) [hereinafter Malamud, Assessing] (“[A]ffirmative action programs tend to
benefit the best-off among those who have been deemed sufficiently disadvantaged to be eligible
for affirmative action.”).
130. See, e.g., Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 375 (citing Anthony P. Carnevale &
Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in
AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 150–
51 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004) [hereinafter Carnevale & Rose, Socioeconomic Status];
Malamud, Assessing, supra note 129, at 458).
131. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 731–32; Press Release, Princeton Univ., Study: Tex.
“10 Percent Plan” Fails to Sustain Diversity at Flagship Univs. (Jan. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/pr/news/03/q1/0123-tienda.htm.
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into Florida’s college and university system.132 The study found that in 2000
and 2001, only 150 and 177 students, respectively, benefited from the Talented
20 program because they had a GPA below 3.0, the necessary GPA for
“regular system-wide admission consideration.”133 A simulation study of the
potential impact of California’s percentage plan showed a more positive effect
in California: “between 60 and 65 percent of students in the top 4 percent
already met current UC eligibility criteria.”134
The problem with these studies is that they focus on the minimum eligibility
criteria of the state university systems, and ignore the fact that, prior to
percentage plans, students competed based on their grades and standardized
test scores. Percentage plans potentially help those students who perform
poorly on standardized tests, and those individuals often belong to
underrepresented minorities.135 When colleges eliminate standardized scores

132. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43 (citing PATRICIA MARIN & EDGAR K. LEE, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN THE SUNSHINE STATE:
THE TALENTED 20 PROGRAM IN FLORIDA 22–23 (2003)).
133. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43. See also Mark C. Long, Race and College
Admissions: An Alternative to Affirmative Action?, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1020, 1032 (2004)
(finding that Florida’s percentage plan only affected “4% [of applicants] . . . denied by all of the
Florida public colleges to which they applied”).
134. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43.
135. In 2013, the College Board reported the following mean SAT scores by ethnicity in
critical reading, mathematics, and writing:
Ethnicity
American
Indian or
Alaska
Native
Asian, Asian
American
Black or
African
American
Mexican or
Mexican
American
Puerto Rican
Other
Hispanic
White

Reading

Mathematics

Writing

480

486

461

521

597

527

431

429

418

449

464

442

456

453

445

450

461

443

527

534

515

THE COLL. BD., 2013 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 3 tbl.8
(2013). See also Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21 (“There is
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from admissions criteria, the schools “reaffirm[] the superiority of
performance-based over test-based merit criteria.”136
Another concern with implementing percentage programs is that they
depend on the racial and economic segregation of high schools.137 In fact,
percentage plans may succeed in Texas, California, and Florida as a result of
the racial segregation of schools in those states.138 It might take considerable
time before the problem of racially segregated schools is remedied.139 In the
interim, because percentage plans increase the possibility for minority students
attending segregated schools to attend college, critics should embrace
percentage plans as one targeted solution to a broader systemic problem.
Although percentage plans are “by no means a national panacea, [they] offer[]
a useful example of experimental and democratic decision making that
changed admissions practices to expand opportunities for structural
mobility.”140
A final argument against percentage plans is that the Supreme Court has
never required them. Although the Grutter Court dismissed the suggestion of
percentage plans as an alternative to affirmative action,141 the concerns that
troubled the Court have since largely been addressed. The Court did not
require the adoption of percentage plans because it was apprehensive that
“these alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the
academic quality of all admitted students, or both.”142 As studies show,

overwhelming evidence that African American, Hispanic, and low-income students do not score
as well on standardized tests as do white and high-income students.”).
136. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732.
137. See Adams, supra note 119, at 1734 (discussing the relationship of percentage plans to
segregated schools).
138. As of 2003, “[o]n average, whites in Texas, California, and Florida are in schools
comprised of 66, 58, and 69 percent whites, respectively, making them the most isolated
racial/ethnic group.” HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 27.
139. Professor David Orentlicher suggests that percentage plans may provide an unintended
benefit through the spill-over effect. See Adams, supra note 119, at 1775 (citing David
Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas’ Ten Percent Solution: Improving Diversity and
Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 181–82 (1998)). He projects that parents might move
their children to less rigorous schools to provide their children a competitive edge, and in doing
so, schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods might benefit financially and politically from the
migration of wealthier students. Id.
140. Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals As Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates
of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 217 (2003).
141. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003).
142. Id. The concerns over diversity and academic quality would have been more relevant to
the suggested lottery system than to percentage plans as a race-neutral alternative. See id.
(discussing the use of lottery systems). At the time the Court decided Grutter, there was evidence
available regarding the Berkeley School of Law’s (Boalt Hall’s) success in implementing a race-
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however, percentage plans jeopardize neither diversity nor academic quality.143
To the contrary, studies demonstrate that diversity levels can reach or exceed
levels attained through racial admissions,144 and that students who are accepted
through percentage plans outperform other students.145 Researchers found that
even at UT Austin, students admitted under the percentage plan “not only
outperform their lower-ranked counterparts with test scores 200-300 points
higher, but they also defy predictions that high-achieving students from
underperforming schools are destined for failure because they are ill-prepared
for college level work.”146 As the President of UT Austin attests, “students in
the top 10 percent of their high school class make much higher grades in
college than those who weren’t in the top 10 percent.”147
The Grutter Court also noted the concern that percentage plans preclude
universities from performing individualized reviews to attain diverse
students.148 But individualized assessments are not required for race-neutral
programs; they are only necessary when race is a factor. Also, the use of
percentage plans is not mutually exclusive of programs that incorporate a
holistic review of an applicant. Texas, in the period after Hopwood’s racial
ban and before Grutter, implemented two admissions systems at different
times: one based on high school rank and one based on individualized review

neutral admissions program, which the University of Michigan Law School apparently ignored.
Justice Thomas noted that
[t]he sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall . . . . Prior to [Prop.] 209’s [constitutional
amendment], which bars the State from “grant[ing] preferential treatment . . . on the
basis of race . . . in the operation of . . . public education,” Boalt Hall enrolled 20 blacks
and 28 Hispanics in its first-year class for 1996. In 2002, without deploying express
racial discrimination in admissions, Boalt’s entering class enrolled 14 blacks and 36
Hispanics. Total underrepresented minority student enrollment at Boalt Hall now
exceeds 1996 levels. Apparently the [University of Michigan] Law School cannot be
counted on to be as resourceful. The Court is willfully blind to the very real experience
in California and elsewhere, which raises the inference that institutions with
“reputation[s] for excellence[]” rivaling the Law School’s have satisfied their sense of
mission without resorting to prohibited racial discrimination.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
143. See, e.g., Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732.
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. See, e.g., Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732.
146. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732 (citation omitted).
147. Larry R. Faulkner, “Top 10 Percent" Helps Students, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Oct.-25,-2000,,-http://www.texastop10.princeton.edu/publicity/general/San%20Antonio
%20EN.10.25.00.pdf. See also Larry R. Faulkner, Class Rank Predicts Student Success, -USA
TODAY,-Apr.-5,-2002,-http://www.texastop10.princeton.edu/publicity/general/USA%20Today.04
05.05,-pdf.
148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003). See also Laycock, supra note 71, at
1818 (noting percentage plans’ effect on individualized review).
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without regard to race.149 Texas’s race-neutral multivariate model took into
account standardized SAT/ACT scores, high school curriculum, essays,
leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, geography, characteristics of the
high school, awards and honors, work experience, community service, and
special family circumstances such as socioeconomic status and responsibilities
for the family.150
In fact, the lack of individualized assessment is one of the advantages of
percentage plans, as they allow institutions to save money by avoiding the
administrative costs of individualized reviews. For example, when the
University of Michigan implemented its holistic review of applications in
response to Grutter, it expected to hire twenty additional personnel as
application readers and counselors, with an expected cost of $1.5 to $2 million
dollars, a thirty-three percent increase in the University’s standard operating
costs.151
Moreover, universities and colleges have long employed race-neutral
admissions programs without individualized review.152 As Justice Thomas
previously observed, “[T]here is nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally
protected about ‘selective’ admissions.”153 Prior to selective admissions,
universities customarily relied on certificate programs in which students were
offered admission into a graduate school if they completed course work in a
certified secondary school.154 Entrance exams later replaced the certificate
program, but the “‘percent plans’ now used in Texas, California, and Florida
are in many ways the descendants of the certificate system.”155
B. Socioeconomic Status: Class-Based Affirmative Action
Class-based affirmative action, which admits students on the basis of their
socioeconomic status, is a second race-neutral option that colleges and
universities should explore. Research has identified socioeconomic status156 as

149. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013) (describing Texas’s evolving
admissions program in response to Hopwood and Grutter).
150. Id.; Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 715.
151. Greg Winter, U. of Michigan Alters Admission Use of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003,
at A12.
152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 368–69 (explaining the history of certificate programs for graduate schools).
155. Id. at 369 (citation omitted).
156. Some scholars use “class” and “socioeconomic status” interchangeably. Angela
Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s in a
Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2011). Others consider “class” and
“socioeconomic status” distinct in that “class” means one’s economic or social status whereas
“socioeconomic status” necessarily contemplates one’s race. Id. at 809.
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a salient factor in performance on standardized tests;157 a link is visible as early
as primary school and carries through high school.158 Studies show that lowincome students lag behind their more economically advantaged peers in
reading and math: only fourteen percent of low-income fourth graders are
proficient in reading, as compared to forty-one percent of their economically
advantaged cohorts, and nine percent of low-income fourth graders are
proficient in math, as compared to thirty-three percent of their economically
advantaged peers.159
Additionally, researchers Anthony Carnevale and Jeff Strohl discovered that
low socioeconomic status was a prevalent predictor of low SAT scores.160
Coming from a low socioeconomic background impacted students by 399
points on the SAT, as compared with race (being African American as opposed
to white), which had an average impact of fifty-six points.161 Georgetown
University researchers found that the link between socioeconomic status and
standardized test performance is “seven times as significant as racial ones.”162
Despite the significant impact socioeconomic status has on students’
performance on standardized tests, which affects students’ college admissions,
studies show that elite schools do little to compensate for socioeconomic status
when making admission decisions.163 A survey of nineteen law schools by
Professor Richard Sander shows those schools provided no admission
preference for students having parents with lower education backgrounds (an

157. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra
note 18, at 6.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE
NATION’S REPORT CARD: MATHEMATICS 2000 60–61 (2001)).
160. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 724.
161. Id. (citing Carnevale & Strohl, Increasing College Access, supra note 22, at 173). In
2013, there was a 388 point disparity between the average total SAT scores for students with
family income less than $20,000 (435 mean score for critical reading, 462 mean for mathematics,
and 429 mean for writing) and students coming from families with income more than $200,000
(565 mean score for critical reading, 586 mean for mathematics, and 563 mean for writing).
COLL. BD., 2013 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2013).
This disparity has been consistent over the years. In 2011 and 2012, the disparity between the
two income groups resulted in a difference of 398 and 400 SAT points, respectively. COLL. BD.,
2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2012); COLL. BD.,
2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2011). See also
Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Inevitable Irrelevance of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 39 J.C. &
U.L. 1, 45–46 (2013) (discussing the College Board 2011 study).
162. Richard Kahlenberg, Online Fisher Symposium: In Defense of Race-Neutral Alternative
Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/
online-fisher-symposium-in-defense-of-race-neutral-alternative-jurisprudence/.
163. See Richard H. Sander, Class In American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631,
656 (2011) [hereinafter Sander, Class in American Legal Education].
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indicator of low socioeconomic status).164 Similarly, Carnevale and scholar
Stephen Rose found no socioeconomic status preference among the top 146
undergraduate schools, compared with a three-fold racial preference.165
Research by authors William Bowen, Martin Kurzweil, and Eugene Tobin also
showed that students from low socioeconomic backgrounds received no
preferences, whereas racial preferences accounted for 27.7 percentage
points.166
Thus, it is unsurprising that elite law schools have dismal enrollment
numbers for students of low socioeconomic status. Professor Sander found
that low socioeconomic status students (the bottom quarter of the population)
only represent about two percent of students at the top twenty law schools
compared to over seventy-five percent of students from the wealthiest
socioeconomic group (the top quartile of the population) who attend these elite
law schools.167 Other researchers found similar trends at elite undergraduate
schools as well. Carnevale and Rose discovered that, of the students who
attended the most selective 146 undergraduate colleges and universities, three
percent represented the poorest socioeconomic quartile while seventy-four
percent represented the most affluent.168 Among the general population of
students entering postsecondary education from 1989 to 1990, researchers
found that only fifteen percent of students were from families in the lowest
socioeconomic quartile while forty percent of students came from the highest
quartile.169
Relatedly, minorities who benefit from race-based affirmative action come
from the most affluent backgrounds. According to Professor Sander’s study of
elite law schools, eighty-nine percent of African Americans and sixty-three
percent of Latinos admitted into those highly selective schools come from the
top socioeconomic half of the population.170 Likewise, a study conducted by
authors Derek Bok and William Bowen found that at twenty-eight elite
colleges and universities, eighty-six percent of African Americans represented

164. Id. at 655–57.
165. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 721 (citing Carnevale & Rose, Socioeconomic
Status, supra note 130, at 141–42, 148–49).
166. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 721–22 (citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN
A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 105 tbl.5.1, 166 (2005)).
167. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 639 tbl.1.
168. See Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 719 (citing Carnevale & Rose,
Socioeconomic Status, supra note 130, at 106 tbl.3.1).
169. PATRICK T. TERENZINI, ALBERTO F. CABRERA, & ELENA M. BERNAL, SWIMMING
AGAINST THE TIDE: THE POOR IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION v (2001).
170. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 651 tbl.8.
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middle or high socioeconomic status.171 The explanation for why few
minorities are represented in the lower socioeconomic strata of the student
body at elite schools is that “minorities are minorities”; in other words, there
are more poor white students whose numbers, simply by being the majority,
reduce the representative impact of poor minorities.172
Although schools do little to give admissions preferences for students from
low socioeconomic backgrounds, one would expect schools to provide
significant financial aid to the few low-income students actually admitted.
Yet, studies show elite schools provide more financial help to the wealthy.173
Professor Sander’s research indicates that affluent whites receive twice the
amount of grants and scholarships than low-income whites, and affluent
African Americans receive four times that amount.174
Recognizing the impact of socioeconomic status on university admissions
rates and the failure of schools to compensate for socioeconomic status, some
scholars have suggested designing socioeconomic status affirmative action
programs to achieve diversity.175 An affirmative action program premised on
socioeconomic status raises two questions: 1) Does achieving socioeconomic
status diversity result in racial diversity?
2) Do students with low
socioeconomic status enrich the educational environment, act as community or
political leaders, act as role models, or provide community service?176
The debate surrounding use of socioeconomic status as a factor, and proxy,
for race centers on whether it sufficiently furnishes schools with racially
diverse students or whether it should be embraced as a separate factor.177

171. See Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 720–21 (citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN &
DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 341 tbl.B.2 (1998)).
172. Deborah C. Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88
DENV. U. L. REV. 729, 732 (2011) [hereinafter Malamud, Class Privilege].
173. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 661 tbl.12.
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1930 (1996); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 473 (1997) [hereinafter Sander, Experimenting]. For
criticisms of socioeconomic affirmative action programs, see William C. Kidder, Misshaping the
River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55–56 (2013);
Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 504 (1997)
[hereinafter Malamud, A Response]; Malamud, Class Privilege, supra note 172.
176. See Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U.
L. REV. 683, 688 (2011) (expressing doubt about the contribution that students with low
socioeconomic status can make in and outside of the classroom).
177. Kali Borkoski, Ask the Author: Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. on Mismatch,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 16, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/ask-the-authorrichard-sander-and-stuart-taylor-jr-on-mismatch/ (“The moral for our broader national debate is
that SES [socioeconomic status] preferences work best if we value socioeconomic diversity for its
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Race-based affirmative action advocates argue that socioeconomic status
should not replace race consideration,178 but instead, work in conjunction with
race179 because consideration of socioeconomic status alone does not provide
sufficient racial diversity.180 One explanation scholars provide for the limited
effectiveness of class-based programs is that socioeconomic status and
minority membership are not perfectly correlated.181 Although twenty-five
own sake.”). Some scholars advance socioeconomic affirmative action on meritocratic principles.
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 175, at 1934–51. Others value socioeconomic diversity for more
varied reasons:
(1) Greater socioeconomic diversity in law schools can produce a richer education for
all students, by making the range of experiences brought to law school closer to the
“real” world. (2) Bringing more low-SES people into law school, and hence into the
legal profession, confers more legitimacy on the profession and makes it better able to
respond to the needs of the public. (3) Increased access to low-SES applicants actually
improves the quality of the student body, because test scores and other admissions
criteria understate the ability of low-SES applicants. (4) Helping low-SES people to
enter higher education increases social mobility and thus helps, however modestly, to
reduce poverty and increase equality.
Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 475.
178. Professor Douglas Laycock argues that any proxy for race is inherently less effective
than considering race itself in admission decisions:
Proxy selectors would be race-neutral admission criteria that benefit minority
applicants disproportionately. Such proxy selectors avoid the explicit consideration of
race, but that is their only virtue. In every other way, there are far inferior to the direct
consideration of race. They achieve far less diversity and do far more damage to
admission standards. This is for quite general reasons inherent in the basic approach.
Laycock, supra note 71, at 1808.
179. Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race &
Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751, 787 (2011).
180. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 377 (citing Mark C. Long, Affirmative Action and Its
Alternatives in Public Universities: What Do We Know?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 315, 321–23
(2007)); T. Vance McMahan & Don R. Willett, Hope from Hopwood: Charting a Positive Civil
Rights Course for Texas and the Nation, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 166–67 (1999) (“[A]
study released by the Coordinating Board’s Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, a
group of sociologists and demographers from Texas schools, found that any criteria besides race
would affect only half the number of minorities helped by affirmative action programs.”).
181. Bowen, supra note 179, at 754 (“[D]ata indicat[es] that class and race are not
interchangeable.”); Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 378 (citing Thomas J. Espenshade &
Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 SOC.
SCI. Q. 293, 296–303 (2005)); Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criterion: The Social Science
and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065,
1095, 1117 (1997) (“There is no good proxy, no more narrowly tailored criterion, no statistical
treatment that can replace race.”); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action
in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 468–78 (2004). Paradoxically, if there is a
strong correlation between race and socioeconomic status, the question that schools must confront
is whether using socioeconomic status will be challenged as a proxy. Professor Laycock surmises
that “the stronger a proxy’s correlation with race, the more likely it is to be challenged as a
sham.” Laycock, supra note 71, at 1810.
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percent of Hispanics and African Americans live in poverty,182 by virtue of
being a majority, there are more whites that are impoverished.183
The effectiveness of class-based programs depends on how a school defines
economic disadvantage. One definition is simply to focus on the applicant’s
parents’ income.184 Another method is to consider parents’ income, education,
and occupation.185 A third approach evaluates those factors, but also whether
the applicant attends a disadvantaged school, lives in a poor neighborhood, and
comes from a single-parent household.186 A fourth, more comprehensive,
option is to define socioeconomic status by the preceding factors and wealth.187
Measuring socioeconomic status in its broadest form is the best solution to
increase diversity.188
Some argue wealth should be included in the
determination of socioeconomic status because wealth can access education
and facilitate social networks.189 Further, research suggests that wealth is an
important consideration because when wealth and other socioeconomic factors
are controlled, the racial disparity in educational outcomes, like high school
and college graduation, is less visible.190
When properly defined, socioeconomic affirmative action programs are
successful at achieving diversity. One study shows that using socioeconomic
status as a boost can increase underrepresented minority enrollment even more
than race-based programs alone.191 The University of Colorado at Boulder
investigated the effects of class-based affirmative action at a “moderately
selective” university using admission decisions rather than enrollment
decisions.192 The study found that class-based admission criteria increased the

182. Bowen, supra note 179, at 766. See also Lempert, supra note 176, at 690 & n.17
(suggesting “wealth may be the most important indicator of a family’s social class”).
183. Many scholars have made this observation. See, e.g., TERENZINI, CABRERA & BERNAL,
supra note 169, at 3; Malamud, Assessing, supra note 129, at 465.
184. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1074–
75 (1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based]. Using income as the sole metric of
socioeconomic status has engendered debate regarding the benefits and disadvantages of defining
socioeconomic status narrowly or broadly. See id. (discussing the various ways socioeconomic
status can be measured). Professor Deborah Malamud cautions that defining socioeconomic
status too broadly may dilute the classroom presence of minorities and those most economically
disadvantaged. See Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 501–02 (addressing Professor
Malamud’s critique of class-based affirmative action).
185. Kahlenberg, Class-Based, supra note 184, at 1074–78.
186. Id. at 1078–82.
187. Id. at 1074.
188. Id. at 1083.
189. Bowen, supra note 179, at 770–71.
190. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based, supra note 184, at 1083.
191. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 386–70, 397–98.
192. Id. at 369–70.
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admission rates for African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans more
than race-based programs did.193 The researchers explained this unexpected
finding: “The class-based approach at [the subject university] is comparatively
privileged in this context.
Under the [study’s] Disadvantage and
Overachievement Indices, identification can grant primary factor
consideration. Under race-conscious affirmative action at [the university],
[underrepresented minority] status is always a secondary factor.”194 As this
study reveals, the success of a class-based program with increasing racial
diversity depends on how much weight universities afford socioeconomic
status.195 Professor Richard Sander recommends that socioeconomic status
receive equal consideration as race.196
Class-based programs at three University of California law schools have also
increased racial diversity.197 Responding to Prop. 209’s ban on race
considerations in 1996, California’s undergraduate and graduate schools were
forced to implement race-neutral programs.198 Using class-based affirmative
action, Hispanic enrollment in California’s law schools increased from 7.2% in
1997 (before Prop. 209 became effective) to 11.9% in 2003, and AfricanAmerican enrollment increased from 1.9% to 4.7% in the same years.199
Another class-based study at the UCLA School of Law found that adjusting
for socioeconomic status could bring increased racial diversity.200 When
UCLA Law School implemented its socioeconomic affirmative action
program, although the percentage of black and American Indian enrollment
fell,201 when fluctuations in applications were taken into account, Latino
enrollment remained steady and underrepresented Asian American enrollment
increased.202 Overall, “minority groups benefitted disproportionately from the

193. Id. at 392.
194. Id. at 393.
195. Id.
196. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 476. More selective schools provide greater
weight to race. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 399 (“At many selective private and public
schools, the admissions boost for minority status is quite large.”). In law schools, the top ten
schools employ “the most aggressive use of affirmative action.” Bowen, supra note 179, at 768.
See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 26 (suggesting affirmative action programs should be
broadened).
197. Nelson, supra note 119, at 18, 22.
198. Id. at 18.
199. Id.
200. See Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 473 (describing UCLA Law School’s
class-based affirmative action program).
201. See id. at 497 n.46 (suggesting one reason for the decline in African American and
American Indian enrollment was due to the decline of applications).
202. Id. at 473.
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class-based preferences.”203 Fifty-five percent of the students admitted to the
UCLA Law School received a socioeconomic status preference, and among
these admits, the school’s acceptance rates for African American and Latino
applicants were particularly high.204 In addition to attaining racial diversity,
UCLA Law School’s program reached new academic heights. In 2000,
students who were part of the entering class that benefited from a
socioeconomic preference achieved the highest bar passage rate in the school’s
history.205
At the undergraduate level, underrepresented minority school enrollment in
California increased from eighteen percent in 1997 to twenty-four percent in
2008.206 Although enrollment of underrepresented minorities at Berkeley and
UCLA, two of California’s most elite public undergraduate institutions,
suffered the year following Prop. 209’s enactment, their minority enrollment
has grown to twenty percent under class-based affirmative action, compared
with twenty-three percent under race-based affirmative action.207 The elite
University of Michigan Law School considered an increase from 13.55% to
20.1% minority students in its entering class a “critical mass,”208 and thus a
successful program. Therefore, by the University of Michigan Law School’s
standard, these socioeconomic status programs have largely been successful.
Putting aside the debate on how socioeconomic status should be
operationalized,209 studies show that preferences for socioeconomic status “can
achieve racial diversity.”210 The success of class-based programs depends on

203. Id.
204. Id. at 486.
205. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 663.
206. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 724.
207. Id. (citing Tongshan Chang & Heather Rose, A Portrait of Underrepresented Minorities
at the University of California, 1994-2008, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 209 83, 84–89 (Eric Grodsky & Michal
Kurlaender eds., 2010)).
208. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389–90 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 726.
209. Professor Malamud argues for a broader conception of economic impact beyond wealth
and income because when black students’ performance on tests are affected by stereotype threats,
“something ‘economic’ has taken place.” Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 508.
Therefore, she concludes that “no program of class-based affirmative action can hope to capture
the ways in which race exacerbates economic disadvantage and stands in the way of the full
enjoyment of economic privilege.” Id. at 509. Professor Malamud explains, “The reason is that
being black in America compounds economic disadvantage, undercuts economic progress, and
depresses academic performance in ways too profound and too complex for any reasonable raceblind system to capture.” Id.
210. Id. at 509.
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the magnitude of the socioeconomic status preference211 and the breadth of
measuring socioeconomic status.212
Institutions may be tempted to reject socioeconomic status programs because
a particular school’s diversity success might be due to its unique
circumstances. For example, UCLA Law School’s success at attaining
diversity, while relying solely on socioeconomic status, was attributed to the
unique circumstance of California’s “substantial number of low[socioeconomic status], high-achieving Asian students, many of them
immigrants or the children of immigrants.”213 Although there may be unique
circumstances that make some socioeconomic-based programs successful in
some places, Fisher’s mandate that schools use workable race-neutral
alternatives puts the burden on schools to justify why a class-based program
would be unworkable. While UCLA’s decision to exclude wealth as part of
the socioeconomic status calculation can be criticized,214 if wealth had been
part of the calculus, UCLA’s program would have attained even greater
diversity because African Americans have significantly less wealth than whites
with the same income level.215 The University of California at Los Angeles
Law School’s achievement of a diverse entering class without considering
wealth further supports the potential of socioeconomic affirmative action
programs as a race-neutral alternative. Schools need to study existing
programs and critically assess what characteristics of the program and the
state’s population make it unlikely that the school can successfully implement
a similar socioeconomic program.
As part of its consideration, schools should weigh the costs of a
socioeconomic affirmative action program. Perhaps the greatest burden on
schools undertaking a socioeconomic affirmative action program will be the
financial cost. Although UCLA’s operating costs were minimally affected by
integrating socioeconomic status into its admissions program, its financial aid
system could have been greatly impacted.216 Anticipating that the school

211. Socioeconomic affirmative action programs’ success at achieving diversity compared
with that of race-based programs depends largely on how much preference is given to race.
Professor Sander explains that
[w]hat varied was the size of the old racial preference; the greater the traditional
preference, the less effectively class worked as a “substitute” for race. How the classfor-race tradeoffs would operate in other schools or other contexts, then, depends on the
magnitude of current racial preferences in those settings.
Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 473.
212. See Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 511.
213. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 663 n.89.
214. See Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 507 (providing a critical analysis of the
UCLA Law School’s socioeconomic admissions program).
215. Id.
216. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 499.
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would need to provide larger financial grants if it increased the enrollment of
students from lower income families, UCLA “scaled down its grant levels
enough to offset the higher burdens.”217 As UCLA’s program demonstrates, a
school must be earnest in finding solutions to support its socioeconomic
affirmative action program.218 Therefore, in order to show that socioeconomic
preference is an unworkable race-neutral alternative, it is insufficient for
schools to merely identify the costs; they must also explain why the costs are
too burdensome and why they are unable to offset those costs in order to
satisfy Fisher.
C. Legacy Preferences and Development Admits
In addition to including neutral factors that correlate with racial/ethnic
diversity, in order to comport with the narrowly tailored requirement, schools
should eliminate legacy preferences that disproportionately help white students
from privileged families or with alumni connections.219 Ninety-six percent of
Ivy League alumni are white.220 In particular, at Harvard, legacy applicants
enjoy a forty percent admission rate while only fifteen percent of non-legacy
applicants are admitted.221 Similarly, in 2003, Princeton extended offers to
thirty-five percent of legacy applicants compared with ten percent of overall
applicants, the University of Pennsylvania admitted fifty-one percent of legacy
applicants despite only admitting twenty-one percent of overall applicants, and
Notre Dame extended legacy preferences to twenty-three percent of legacy
applicants in 2003222 and fifty percent in 2005.223 Legacy preferences account

217. Id.
218. Id. (discussing how UCLA supported its socioeconomic affirmative action program by
scaling down grant levels).
219. Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives Work, supra note 25. Daniel Golden of the Wall
Street Journal has written a series of Pulitzer Prize-winning articles exposing the admissions
advantages white students receive. See Daniel Golden, At Many Colleges, the Rich Kids Get
Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Golden, Rich Kids]; Daniel
Golden, Bill Would Make Colleges Report Legacies, Early Admissions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2003, at B1; Daniel Golden, For Groton Grads, Academics Aren’t Only Keys to Ivies, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 25, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Golden, Groton Grads]; Daniel Golden, For Supreme Court,
Affirmative Action Isn’t Just Academic, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A1; Daniel Golden,
Preference for Alumni Children in College Admission Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at
A1 [hereinafter Golden, Draws Fire].
220. Bowen, supra note 179, at 774 (citing TIM J. WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL
PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 122 (2005)).
221. Id.
222. Golden, Draws Fire, supra note 219. Other universities similarly admit legacies at
almost double, and sometimes more than double, the rate of their overall admissions, as
demonstrated by the following chart compiled by researchers Steve Shadowen, Sozi Tulante, and
Shara Alpern:
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for ten to twenty-five percent of the student population at elite colleges and
universities, compared with, for example, the California Institute of
Technology, where there are no legacy preferences and only 1.5% of admitted
students are children of alumni.224
Although legacy applicants are generally admitted at higher rates, they are
less qualified than other applicants225 and are outperformed by affirmative
action students.226 A 1990 report by the United States Department of
Education described Harvard legacy admits as “significantly less qualified”

Year

Overall Admit
Rate (%)

Legacy
Admit
Rate (%)

Amherst

2005

20

50

Bowdoin

1980

21

52

Columbia

1993

32

51

Dartmouth

1991

27

57

Harvard

2002

11

40

Middlebury

2006

27

45

Notre Dame

2005

20

50

Pennsylvania

2004

21

51

Princeton

2002

10

35

Stanford

2006

13

25

Yale

2002

11

29

School

Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 57 tbl.1. See also Daniel Golden, An Analytic
Survey of Legacy Preference, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 71, 76 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) [hereinafter Golden, Analytic
Survey] (detailing enrollment rates for legacies at top universities).
223. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 57 tbl.1.
224. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.
225. See Jodi S. Cohen et al., Clout Goes to College, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2009,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-uofi-clout,0,6326007.story [hereinafter Cohen et
al., Clout] (“In 2008, for example, freshmen on average ranked in the [eighty-eighth] percentile in
their high school class, while clouted students ranked in the [seventy-sixth] percentile.”).
226. Bowen, supra note 179, at 774–75. A study by Duke Professor Kenneth Spenner and
Duke graduate student Nathan D. Martin revealed that legacy applicants at Duke University were
admitted despite having lower academic credentials compared to other applicants with parents
who hold degrees from other colleges. Scott Jaschik, Legacy Admits: More Money, Lower
Scores,-INSIDE-HIGHER-ED-(Aug.-4,-2008),-http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/08/04/
legacy. Compared to that same group, Duke’s legacy admits also had lower first year grades. Id.
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than non-legacy students in all areas, except perhaps sports.227 During its
investigation of the admissions procedures of Harvard and UCLA, the
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights found that, in some
instances, the legacy preference “was the critical or decisive factor.”228 Other
research showed that highly selective colleges admitted approximately fifteen
percent of white applicants who failed to meet the minimum standards.229
Carnevale and Rose discovered that when they compared the admissions
criteria of the top 146 colleges and universities with the academic profiles of
admitted students,230 white students were twice as likely to be admitted, despite
lacking minimum standards, as compared to black and Hispanic students
admitted based on race.231
Like legacy admits, development admits232 are accepted because they are
related to rich, influential, or famous people whom the school intends to
cultivate as major donors.233 Some development admits do not necessarily
have alumni relatives, but the two frequently overlap.234 Given their potential
to lead to significant institutional endowments, development admits enjoy the

227. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 42 (2011).
228. Peter Schmidt, A History of Legacy Preferences and Privilege, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 33, 62 (Richard D. Kahlenberg
ed., 2010) [hereinafter Schmidt, A History].
229. Peter Schmidt, At the Elite Colleges—Dim White Kids, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/28/at_the_elite_colle
ges___dim_white_kids/?page=full [hereinafter Schmidt, Dim White Kids] (discussing studies by
“[r]esearchers with access to closely guarded admissions data”).
230. The irony of aspiring to achieve a meritocratic system that treats applicants fairly while
still allowing legacy preferences has not escaped scholars’ attention. Justice Thomas, for
example, has criticized legacies for this reason:
The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would
be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous
exceptions to “merit.” For example, in the national debate on racial discrimination in
higher education admissions, much has been made of the fact that elite institutions
utilize a so-called “legacy” preference to give the children of alumni an advantage in
admissions. This, and other, exceptions to a “true” meritocracy give the lie to
protestations that merit admissions are in fact the order of the day at the Nation’s
universities.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367–68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
231. Schmidt, Dim White Kids, supra note 229.
232. See Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219 (“The formal practice of giving preference to
students who parents are wealthy—sometimes called ‘development admits’—has implications for
the legal challenge to affirmative action . . . .”).
233. See Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72 (describing development admits as
“children of major donors, trustees, politicians, celebrities, and others”).
234. Id.
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same favors as privileged legacy admits: admission despite failing to meet
academic standards of the school.235 For example, Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist Daniel Golden reports that Duke University “relaxed [its] standards
to admit 100 to 125 students annually as a result of family wealth or
connections, up from about 20 a decade ago.”236 Previously, these students
were tentatively rejected or placed on the wait list.237 Harold Wingood, former
Senior Associate Director of Admissions at Duke, and later Dean of
Admissions at Clark University, provides an insider’s perspective about
Duke’s procedures: “We’d take students in some cases with SAT scores 100
points below the mean, or just outside the top 15% of their class. . . . They
weren’t slugs, but they weren’t strong enough to get in on their own.”238
Legacy preferences and development admissions act as more than mere
tiebreakers on an applicant’s chances of acceptance.239 Princeton University’s
Senior Scholar Thomas Espenshade concludes that being a legacy admit is
equivalent to adding 160 SAT points to a candidate’s score (on the former SAT
scale of 400-1600).240 Similarly, William Bowen and colleagues from the
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation found that legacy preferences increased a
candidate’s chances of being admitted to an elite institution by 19.7%.241 For
example, the University of Michigan awards up to twenty discretionary points,
out of a total 150 point system, to applicants related to donors, legislators,
faculty, and other notables.242
Aside from the admission preference, legacy applicants enjoy an array of
other advantages because of their legacy associations. Some of the extra
benefits include “well-developed mechanisms for providing the children of
alumni with coaching and ‘insider’ information to improve their odds of

235. See Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. One parent of a Duke applicant recognized that her daughter’s academic record did
not meet Duke’s typical standards:
She’s bright, she had good grades, but she doesn’t meet the superstar status . . . . Did
my normal child take the place of somebody who could really make a difference in the
world? Sure, yes, to an extent. But there are so many things you can lose sleep over.
I’m happy for me and my child.
Id. The daughter also acknowledged her acceptance “wasn’t necessarily on [her] own merits.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 74 (citing BOWEN, KURZWEIL & TOBIN,
supra note 166); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.
240. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26. Accord Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note
24, at 56 (finding that, at some elite universities, legacy admits receive a boost of twenty to 160
SAT points).
241. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.
242. Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219.
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acceptance; formal policies affording a second or even third chance to legacies
who fail to make the cut; and scholarships and tuition discounts . . . .”243
Brown University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of
Miami have advising programs or admissions counseling for legacy
applicants.244 Some schools, such as the University of Miami, also afford
legacy applicants interviews unavailable to regular applicants.245
The high admissions rate of legacy preferences and developmental admits
results from the close communication between a school’s development and
admissions offices; the admissions office is made aware of any applicant with
family members who are major donors.246 Stanford Admissions Dean Robin
Mamlet admits, “I will certainly factor in a history of very significant giving to
Stanford . . . .”247 Other admissions deans at selective colleges make similar
acknowledgements. For example, Brown University’s Admissions Dean
Michael Goldberger shares that “having a building named after your family on
[Brown’s] campus would be a plus factor.”248 The University of Miami makes
clear on its webpage the priority it gives to legacy applications: “As admission
to UM becomes increasingly more selective, it is important that we pay special
attention to [the school’s] relationship with alumni and take exceptional care in
evaluating legacy applications.”249
There is simply no justification for legacy preferences and development
admits other than to garner donations from alumni or favors from influential
people. At one prestigious law school, it was reported that children of
powerful politicians were specially admitted in exchange for the politicians
providing jobs for the school’s students.250 At that same university, “more
than 800 undergraduate applicants [within a span of] five years received
special consideration because they were backed by [the university’s] trustees,
legislators, and others in powerful posts.”251

243. Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 34.
244. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 75.
245. Id. at 82.
246. Golden, Groton Grads, supra note 219.
247. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Legacy Admission, U. MIAMI, http://www6.miami.edu/alumni/umaa/legacy.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2014). See also Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 82.
250. See Cohen et al., Clout, supra note 225 (exposing the formalized system of special
favoritism given to well-connected applicants); Jodi S. Cohen et al., U. of I. Jobs-for-Entry
Scheme, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-ui-trustees-26jun26,0,3541380.story [hereinafter Cohen et al., Jobs-for-Entry]. See also Onwuachi-Willig &
Fricke, supra note 156, at 831–32; Justin Pope, Illinois Scandal Exposes Favoritism in
Admissions,–USA–TODAY,–(June–4,–2009,–8:43–PM),–http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
education/2009-06-04-illinois-favoritism_N.htm.
251. Cohen et al., Jobs-for-Entry, supra note 250.
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Defenders of legacy preferences and development admissions justify the
preferences because resulting donations “help[] [schools] provide financial aid
to students in need.”252 Yet the Chronicle of Higher Education found that at
colleges receiving more than $500 million in endowments, disproportionately
few low-income students benefit.253
Others might defend legacy preferences and development admits on the
basis that those admits lead to essential financial support for colleges and
universities. For example, “one state university that had eliminated legacy
preference hurriedly recanted for fear of jeopardizing a multibillion-dollar
fundraising campaign.”254 However, there is no statistically significant
evidence showing a causal relationship between legacy preferences and
donations by alumni at the top 100 universities.255 Equally significant is that
the seven institutions that stopped giving legacy preferences during the study
suffered “no short-term measurable reduction” in donations from alumni as a
result of ceasing legacy preferences.256 The study demonstrates that “[t]he data
that is currently publicly available refutes the received wisdom that the
preferences result in increased private giving.”257
Further, those legacy preferences supporters argue there is little difference
between giving legacy preferences and state institutions setting aside seats for
in-state students because their parents pay state taxes.258 This argument
ignores the stark statistical data about race. Setting aside seats for in-state
students affords any state resident’s child an equal chance at admittance and

252. Schmidt, Dim White Kids, supra note 229.
253. Id.
254. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72.
255. See Coffman, O’Neil & Starr, supra note 26, at 101 (studying the relationship between
legacy admits and donations at the top 100 universities from 1998-2008); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths,
supra note 26.
256. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 131 (noting “[t]he only school that experienced a
decrease, Texas A&M, started experiencing a decline years before it announced the end of legacy
preferences”). Texas A&M’s drop in donations was similar to that experienced by other top
Texas universities, which did not alter their legacy preferences during the time of the study. Id. at
131–32. The study concluded that the decline in donations to Texas universities was a result of
the slow economy. Id. at 132. After Texas A&M yielded to pressure to eliminate its legacy
preference in 2004, donations dropped to $61.9 million from $65.6 million in 2003. Golden,
Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 93. But in 2005, donations to Texas A&M skyrocketed to $92
million, then $95.2 million in 2006 and $114 million in 2007. Id.
257. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 132.
258. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Debating Legacy Preferences in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15,
2011,
7:49
PM),
http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/legacyadmissions/?_php=true&_
type=blogs&_r=0 (quoting Debra J. Thomas and Terry L. Shepard, former college administrators,
each of whom defends legacy admissions).
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does not perpetuate racial disadvantages. Moreover, to compare legacy
preferences to in-state preferences is to ignore the impact of prior
discriminatory barriers to education for minorities.259 Elite schools established
legacy preferences as a discriminatory response to the admission of the
“‘wrong’ types of students.”260 In the 1920s, an overwhelming number of
Jewish applicants qualified on the merits for admission into elite schools.261
Consequently, the colleges applied quotas that capped the number of Jewish
admits, but later sought other ways to limit Jewish enrollment when the quotas
became controversial.262 Legacy preference at schools such as Yale, Harvard,
and Princeton was one such method.263
Additionally, legacy preferences perpetuate the oppression suffered by
minorities. That minorities may now be admitted to top colleges does not
account for the generations that could not enter segregated colleges and
universities. In fact, “‘no selective college or university was making
determined efforts to seek out and admit substantial numbers of African
Americans’ before 1960.”264 In Mississippi, for example, “[i]t was not until
1962 that the first black student, James Meredith, was admitted to a white
public college in [the state], and then only under the court order and with the
protection of federal troops.”265 Until 1969, the University of Texas Law

259. See Onwuachi-Willig & Fricke, supra note 156, at 831 (discussing the discriminatory
effect of legacy preferences).
260. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 56.
261. See Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 39 (discussing the rise of Jewish enrollment
at Harvard and Yale); Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 56 (tracing the origin of
legacy preferences to anti-Semitism); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26 (suggesting “legacies
originated following World War I as a reaction to an influx of immigrant students, particularly
Jews, into America’s selective colleges”). The increase in Jewish immigrants led to a
corresponding rise in Jewish applicants at elite schools:
The first German Jews who came were easily absorbed into the social patter; but at the
turn of the century the bright Russian and Polish Jewish lads from the Boston public
schools began to arrive. There were enough of them in 1906 to form the Menorah
Society, and in another fifteen years Harvard had her “Jewish problem.”
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD: 1636-1936 417 (1946).
262. See Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 40–41; Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.
263. Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 42.
264. Beatrice L. Bridglall, A Misguided Debate About Affirmative Action?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
15, 22 (2006) (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 171, at 74–78; ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA
GOLDBERG, CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS & FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 138–39
(1998)).
265. Gil Kujovich, Desegregation in Higher Education: The Limits of a Judicial Remedy, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). “[I]n 1965, of the one percent of law students who were AfricanAmerican, more than one-third were in all-black law schools . . . .” Marcia G. Synnott, The
Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University
of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 491 (2005).
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School offered scholarships exclusively to whites.266 The University of
Houston did not graduate its “first black law student until 1970 and fewer than
one dozen Mexican Americans graduated before 1972.”267 Notably, at
selective law schools, the number of black students admitted was dismal:
[I]n the early 1960s at schools like Boalt Hall, Michigan, and . . .
[UCLA], the “inexorable zero” routinely characterized African
American enrollment patterns. In the fall of 1965, Boalt, Michigan,
New York University . . . , and UCLA had a combined total of four
African Americans out of 4843 students, which, shockingly, is one
fewer than the University of Mississippi . . . , where the law school
begrudgingly enrolled five [b]lacks in 1965 to avoid jeopardizing a
substantial grant from the Ford Foundation. Similarly, between 1948
and 1968, the University of Texas enrolled a total of 8018 [w]hite
first-year law students and only 37 African Americans. Between
1956 and 1967, there were between zero and two African American
enrollments at [the University of Texas Law School] annually.268
The exclusivity of white institutions of higher learning269 resulted in
generations of white alumni who could pass on the benefit of their admission
to their progeny.270
On the other hand, some may support legacy preferences because they
consider the preference a way to benefit minorities. During oral arguments in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary,271 Justice Sotomayor

266. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 14.
267. Michael A. Olivas, Governing Badly: Theory and Practice of Bad Ideas in College
Decision Making, 87 IND. L.J. 951, 958 (2012) [hereinafter Olivas, Governing Badly].
268. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African
American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 9–10 (2003) (citations omitted).
269. State senator Rodney Ellis previously noted that “[r]ace was used in Texas over a long
period of time to keep people of color, especially African-Americans, out of the higher education
system . . . .” John Brittain & Eric L. Bloom, Admitting the Truth: The Effect of Affirmative
Action, Legacy Preferences, and the Meritocratic Ideal on Students of Color in College
Admissions, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS 123, 140 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Boyce F. Martin, Jr. & Donya Khalili, Privilege Paving the Way for Privilege: How
Judges Will Confront the Legal Ramifications of Legacy Admission to Public and Private
Universities, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS 199, 200 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010). See also Olivas, Governing Badly,
supra note 267, at 958 (“Children of early 1970s UTLS [University of Texas Law School]
minority graduates, if born while their parents attended law school, would now be eligible for the
alumni preference, but they would be in competition with the thousands of white applicants who
could and would also invoke the privilege.”).
271. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
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expressed concerns that if colleges or universities eliminated these preferences,
minorities would suffer: “It’s always wonderful for minorities that they finally
get in, they finally have children and now you’re going to do away for that
preference for them. It seems that the game posts keeps changing every few
years for minorities.”272
To the contrary, minorities are disproportionately harmed by legacy
preferences.273
Underrepresented minorities comprise 6.7% of legacy
applicants compared to 12.5% of total applicants to elite universities.274 At
Texas A&M, for example, the university enrolled 321 white legacy admits in
2002, compared with three black and twenty-five Hispanic legacy admits.275
At the University of Virginia, the population of legacy admits accepted during
early admission was 91% white, 1.6% black, and .05% Hispanic.276 In the
2000-01 academic year, Princeton accepted ten Hispanic and four African
American legacy admits out of a total 567 legacy applicants.277 If one were to
“[j]uxtapose the numbers of white alumni parents whose children apply to
college with those few minorities who are in a position to pass it on, . . . [the
data would suggest that] such admissions will never improve to the point
where alumni privilege produces points for a substantial number of minority
students.”278 While some may doubt whether eliminating legacy preferences at
elite schools makes a meaningful difference in obtaining greater class
equality,279 given the statistics, eliminating legacy preferences will make a
difference in obtaining racial diversity.

272. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623
(2014) (No. 12-682), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/12-682_l537.pdf; Scott Jaschik, Surprise on Legacy Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/10/16/unexpected-exchangesupreme-court-alumni-child-preferences [hereinafter Jaschik, Surprise].
273. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 77.
278. Olivas, Governing Badly, supra note 267, at 957. One study predicts that legacy
admissions for African Americans may rise to nine percent by the year 2020, but the study relies
on assumptions about the fertility rates of minority alumni and whether alumni will intermarry.
See Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composition
of the Legacy Pool, 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9448, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9448.
279. Malamud, Class Privilege, supra note 172, at 742.

2014]

Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action

41

Although the practice of legacy preferences and development admits itself
might not be subject to the demands of strict scrutiny,280 schools that desire to
use race-based admissions are subject to strict scrutiny and should not be
permitted to give these types of preferences. Because Fisher mandates that
schools demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives are not workable before they
rely on racial admissions criteria,281 schools must show they have done all they
can to increase diversity without using race. Such a process should include the
schools’ discontinuation of policies such as legacy preferences and
development admits that predominately benefit whites,282 which decrease a
school’s diversity.283
Although eliminating legacy preferences may not achieve an equivalent
level of diversity as race-based programs,284 “a large legacy population on
campus limits racial and economic diversity.”285 Therefore, a school should
not prevail on using race-based admissions when it has declined to take
measures that reduce racial disparity, such as eliminating legacy and
development admits.286 As Justice Clarence Thomas stated, “Were this court
to have the courage to forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions,

280. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not, however, prohibit the use
of unseemly legacy preferences” and “legacy preferences can stand under the Constitution”).
281. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
282. See Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 98 (noting that “[a]s with legacies in
general, most development cases are white”).
283. Michigan’s Solicitor General made a similar argument during Schuette oral arguments.
See Jaschik, Surprise, supra note 272.
284. Researchers Thomas J. Espenshade and Chang Y. Chung concluded that
even though athlete and legacy applicants are disproportionately white and despite the
fact that athlete and alumni children admission bonuses are substantial, preferences for
athletes and legacies do little to displace minority applicants, largely because athletes
and legacies make up a small share of all applicants to highly selective universities.
Espenshade & Chung, supra note 181, at 304 (emphasis added).
285. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 77.
286. Interestingly, the University of Michigan’s race-based admissions program was
invalidated in Gratz, but the school continues to give legacy preferences. See Jaschik, Surprise,
supra note 272. Its admission policy provides:
The University of Michigan values the relationship it has with current and former
students. These students and alumni are part of the Michigan community; they provide
service and support to the larger university community. As such, application reviewers
take into consideration applicants who have a direct relationship, or stepfamily
relationship, with someone who has attended the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor as
a degree-seeking student.
College Admissions FAQ, MICH. ALUMNI ASS’N, http://alumni.umich.edu/learning/collegeadmissions-faq#q7 (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
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legacy preferences . . . might quickly become less popular . . . .”287 Perhaps the
courage to refrain from giving preferences to legacies and development admits
must begin at the institution.288
D. Other University-Based Programs: Recruitment, Retention, and Financial
Aid
Schools use recruiting, retention, and financial aid programs in conjunction
with their admissions programs to enroll and retain racially diverse students.289
Researchers conclude “the success of percent plans in broadening educational
opportunity beyond high school requires strong outreach efforts to encourage
rank-eligible students to apply for admission.”290 For example, the University
of Texas, with the aid of the private sector, made considerable efforts to recruit
potential minority applicants and benefitted from privately funded minority
scholarships.291 It also funded public scholarships through the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship and the Century Scholars Program for students who
graduate within the top ten percent of their class from high schools that are
traditionally underrepresented at universities and colleges.292 The University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill enables economically disadvantaged students
to attend college debt-free by working ten to twelve hours a week in a federal
work-study program.293 Other universities aggressively recruit from high
schools with high minority population by informing students about higher
education opportunities, the application process, and the admission process.294
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence supports the requirement that
universities implement recruitment, retention, and financial aid programs that
would enhance their diversity before relying on racial classifications.295 The
Court has insisted on consideration of race-neutral alternatives, even those
outside the challenged program’s parameters, to comply with strict scrutiny. In

287. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 n.10 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
288. See Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72 (noting that, in undertaking postlegacy admissions fundraising, “[i]nstitutional courage is also required”).
289. See Laycock, supra note 71, at 1811 (discussing schools’ use of recruiting, scholarships,
and other programs in encouraging minority application and enrollment).
290. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732.
291. See HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 52–55; Laycock, supra note 71, at 1834–35.
292. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 52–54.
293. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18,
at 19.
294. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 52–55.
295. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (discussing race-neutral
options to diversity schools’ student bodies); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 509–
10 (1989) (highlighting available race-neutral alternatives).
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Croson, the Court summarized a broad array of race-neutral alternatives and
noted the city should have contemplated that
[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged
entrepreneurs of all races would open the public contracting market
to all those who have suffered the effects of past societal
discrimination or neglect. Many of the formal barriers to new
entrants may be the product of bureaucratic inertia more than actual
necessity, and may have a disproportionate effect on the
opportunities open to new minority firms. Their elimination or
modification would have little detrimental effect on the city’s
interests and would serve to increase the opportunities available to
minority business without classifying individuals on the basis of
race.296
Although Croson involved remedial discrimination as a basis for the city’s
program, its lessons are equally applicable to affirmative action programs
premised on diversity. The Court’s identification of financial aid as a raceneutral alternative in Croson demonstrates that it is not unrealistic to expect
institutions of higher learning to assist students in funding their education in
order to increase the institutions’ diversity. Similarly, the expectation that
training can ameliorate low diversity levels is easily transferable to universities
and colleges. In order to maintain its diversity, a university can provide
mentoring and academic assistance programs to retain its minority students and
facilitate their matriculation. Also, schools must address the “formal barriers
to new entrants”297 by recruiting from underperforming high schools and
training students who attend those schools about the college application
process. Therefore, like Croson, universities have at their disposal race-neutral
programs that target financing, training, and recruitment to increase diversity.
A university’s failure to consider these options should render its racial program
invalid for failing the narrow tailoring requirement.
E. The Pipeline: Community Outreach
Although colleges and universities are not required to “exhaust[] . . . every
conceivable race-neutral alternative,”298 approaches that focus on increasing
the pipeline of applicants prepared for higher education contribute to diversity
at colleges and universities. Institutions of higher learning recognize that
relying on university-based programs to recruit from minority schools and

296. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509–10.
297. Id. at 510.
298. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 343 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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providing adequate financial assistance is not enough to retain diversity.299
Some higher education institutions seek to increase diversity by improving the
structural underpinnings of education.300 The U.S. Department of Education
has recognized colleges’ and universities’ success in designing race-neutral
programs:
Many colleges and universities around the country are partnering
with elementary and secondary schools, recognizing that these
partnerships expand their educational mission by giving them an
opportunity to put into practice education theory. Moreover,
institutions recognize that helping to better educate young people
who attend traditionally low-performing schools will broaden the
pool of students who can qualify for admission to college.301
Models of these successful outreach programs can be found across the
nation. The University of Houston, for example, supports a K-12 technology
charter school on its campus, and thereby provides 200 students exposure to
“scientific methodology, technological literacy, leadership, and other skills.”302
Texas Tech University reaches out to twenty-six elementary schools by
inviting disadvantaged and minority students to participate in the Future
Scholars program, which pairs students with professors who emphasize college
readiness.303 Baylor University hosts several programs to improve the
education of minority children, such as Science Discovery Week, a summer
camp where students live on campus to take part in science and engineering
activities, and the Center for Learning Abilities and Talent Development,
which provides events such as the February Interdisciplinary Creative Problem
Solving Conference throughout the year.304 Florida offers the College Reach
Out Program for low-income, underperforming students in grades six to
twelve; seventy-two percent of the students served are African American and
ten percent are Hispanic.305
Graduate schools also reach out to the community to improve racial diversity
at their schools. The University of Texas at El Paso Law School founded the

299. See, e.g., McMahan & Willett, supra note 180, at 171 (noting that “many universities
are focusing on helping improve the quality of K-12 education to increase the number of
qualified, college-ready minorities”) (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 171–72 (describing outreach programs directed at grades K-12 schools).
301. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18,
at 12.
302. McMahan & Willett, supra note 180, at 171.
303. Id. (citing Cathy Allen, Texas Needs to Improve Access to College, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 1, 1999, at A31).
304. Id.
305. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18,
at 12.
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Law School Preparation Institute to help students, especially minorities,
prepare for the law school application process and legal studies.306 The
success of the Law School Preparation Institute is demonstrated by studentparticipants’ acceptance at top schools: seventy-three percent attend top 100
law schools, fifty-eight percent attend top fifty law schools, and thirty-three
percent attend top fifteen law schools.307 Additionally, the King Hall Outreach
Program at UC Davis provides participants with classes in writing, logic, and
LSAT preparation.308 Students also have the opportunity to participate in
Moot Court and Mock Trial and meet with tutors and admission personnel.309
The UC Davis School of Law provides another approach by offering a PreLaw Boot Camp “designed to assist high potential undergraduate students from
underrepresented communities with their undergraduate performance and
preparation for admission to law school.”310 Harvard Law School has
partnered with New York University Law School and the Advantage Testing
Foundation to support their TRIALS program, a residential scholarship
program that helps minority and economically disadvantaged students gain
admission to the nation’s leading law schools.311
At the University of Texas, combining outreach programs with race-neutral
admissions programs is effective at achieving diversity. Responding to
Hopwood’s prohibition against consideration of race, UT Austin expanded its
outreach programs to increase minority enrollment while it implemented the
Top Ten Percent plan.312 The school achieved a more diverse entering class
under the post-Hopwood system (that did not explicitly consider race),
compared to when the school implemented a plan that accounted for race.313
Although there has been no study on how much of the school’s increased
diversity can be attributed to community outreach, the University’s record
makes it difficult to ignore that outreach programs are a race-neutral alternative
that can supplement other race-neutral admissions programs.
The importance of outreach programs is widely supported: “[O]utreach and
aid programs that target minority communities and, as a result, double or triple

306. Mission and Goals, U. TEX. EL PASO L. SCH. PREPARATION INST.,
http://academics.utep.edu/Default.aspx?tabid=67363 (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
307. LSPI at UTEP, U. TEX. EL PASO, http://academics.utep.edu/Default.aspx?alias=
academics.utep.edu/law (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
308. KHOP–King Hall Outreach Program, UC DAVIS SCH. L., https://law.ucdavis.edu/
outreach/khop.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
309. Id.
310. Pre-Law Boot Camp, UC DAVIS SCH. L., http://law.ucdavis.edu/prospective/outreach/
pre-law-boot-camp.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
311. TRIALS, http://trials.atfoundation.org/index (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
312. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013).
313. Id. at 2416.
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applications from minority students can contribute strongly to gains.”314
However, the problem with promoting outreach programs is convincing
colleges and universities that costs and administrative burdens are justified.315
Higher education institutions should be obligated to consider outreach
programs as a supplement to other race-neutral programs because, as
previously discussed, the Supreme Court has mandated that race-based
programs be a last resort.316 Further, those race-neutral alternatives should
target increasing opportunities to reach a diverse population of students who
are prepared for higher education. It is widely understood that one underlying
problem with attaining racial diversity in higher education is the dearth of an
applicant pool.317 As the United States Department of Education has
advocated, “developmental approaches . . . demonstrate the wide range of
314. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at viii–ix. See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 26–28
(advocating for higher education schools to include programs that increase access to educational
opportunities for disadvantaged students before they apply); Torres, supra note 128, at 1599
(“Activities like outreach, recruitment, and financial aid are critical to a university in making a
diverse student body possible.”).
315. See Malamud, Class Privilege, supra note 172, at 741 (expressing doubt that “eliteschool admissions offices would find more outreach to be cost justified, given its likely returns”).
316. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[I]ndividual racial classifications .
. . may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieving a compelling interest.”).
In Croson, Justice O’Connor articulated an expectation that race-neutral alternatives be
considered:
As noted by the court below, it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond
Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to
identified discrimination in any way. We limit ourselves to two observations . . . .
First, there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral
means to increase minority business participation in city contracting. . . . Many of the
barriers to minority participation in the construction industry relied upon by the city to
justify a racial classification appear to be race-neutral. If [minority-owned businesses]
disproportionately lack capital or cannot meet bonding requirements, a race-neutral
program of city financing for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority
participation.
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989). The Court’s recommendation that the
city could finance small firms recognizes that race-neutral alternatives should go beyond the
eligibility criteria and remedy the root of the problems that have traditionally kept minorityowned businesses from competing in construction subcontracts. In Parents Involved, Justice
Kennedy pointed out the available race-neutral alternatives to diversify K-12 schools: “strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race.” 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
alternatives Justice Kennedy suggested highlight that schools should be open-minded to solutions
that exist beyond their walls.
317. Bowen, supra note 179, at 766 (lamenting that “it is this lack of available applicants that
is the problem”).
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efforts that can be undertaken to enrich the pipeline of applicants prepared to
succeed in any academic setting . . . .”318
III. TRANSPARENCY
To evaluate whether an alternative works “about as well” as a raced-based
program, one needs to clearly understand the race-based program.
Unfortunately, higher education institutions have not made the details of their
programs transparent.319 Justice Ginsburg warned that precluding schools
from explicitly using race as a factor might cause them to “‘resort to
camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”320 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy feared that “[i]f universities are given the latitude to administer
programs that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few incentives to make
the existing minority admissions schemes transparent and protective of
individual review.”321 By outlawing the use of race as a sole or predominate
factor in school admission programs, the Court has traded in transparency for a
holistic review.322 As Justice Ginsburg observed, “the vaunted alternatives
suffer from ‘the disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.’”323
Fisher may, in fact, remedy the schools’ temptation to obfuscate their
admissions process. In Fisher, the Court reiterated that “[s]trict scrutiny does
not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process
uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the
evidence of how the process works in practice.”324 Compliance with strict
318. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18,
at 5.
319. Borkoski, supra note 177.
320. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As for
holistic review, if universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many may ‘resort to
camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”).
321. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
322. Scholars have similarly observed that the Court’s earlier educational affirmative action
jurisprudence has caused a negative unintended consequence with respect to transparency. See,
e.g., Vikram Amar, Online Fisher Symposium: The Court Needs to Explain Better Why Using
Race in a Softer, Less Visible, Way is Preferable, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 11:54 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-symposium-the-court-needs-to-explain-betterwhy-using-race-in-a-softer-less-visible-way-is-preferable/ (acknowledging that “[i]n Bakke, for
example, Justice Powell never really addresses Justice Brennan’s argument that a race-based
program’s inscrutability to the public should not count in favor its constitutionality”); Roger
Clegg, Commentary: Thoughts on the Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 10, 2012, 7:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/thoughts-on-theoral-argument-in-fisher-v-university-of-texas/ (“The Court’s understandable refusal to accept
quotas, point systems, and the like has the perverse effect of encouraging admission policies that
lack transparency.”).
323. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 2421 (majority opinion).
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scrutiny’s necessity requirement would likely lead schools to be more
transparent about their programs because they would need to articulate their
objective and the measures of success for their program. In order to avoid
being found “feeble in fact,”325 a school must make sufficient disclosure of its
program to satisfy the demanding requirements of narrow tailoring and
necessity.326 According to one commentator, “[a]s both logic and experience
have shown, Grutter’s narrow-tailoring requirements are largely meaningless
without full disclosure of the operation and effects of preferences. Secret
admissions can’t possibly be narrow tailoring.”327
IV. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The Court has “long recognized that, given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”328 The Court’s recognition of academic freedom has
extended to a number of cases. Beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire,329
Justice Frankfurter highlighted “four essential freedoms” of the university: “to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”330
The Court emphasized the commitment to protecting academic freedom in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,331 acknowledging that doing so has

325. Id.
326. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 784 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that “[a]s part of [the
government’s] burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual student’s
race are made in a challenged program”).
327. See Richard Sander, Online Fisher Symposium: A Path to Radical Reform of Racial
Preferences Without Banning Them, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:45 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-symposium-a-path-to-radical-reform-of-racialpreferences-without-banning-them/. See also Borkoski, supra note 177 (explaining Sander’s and
Taylor’s argument that “[t]ransparency would also help preferred-minority students make more
informed choices in choosing colleges and would help inform researchers, voters, and
policymakers”).
328. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). A number of scholars have explored the
implications of affirmative action on academic freedom. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Legal
Scholarship Highlight: Affirmative Action and Academic Freedom, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14,
2012, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/legal-scholarship-highlight-affirmativeaction-and-academic-freedom/.
329. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
330. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (quoting senior scholars and Chancellors
from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
331. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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“transcendent value to all of us and not merely to teachers concerned.”332 In
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,333 the Court acknowledged
that “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision[,] . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional
judgment.”334 Judges “may not override it unless it is such a substantial
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.”335
Further, in its Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz336 decision,
the Court observed that “[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate
academic performance.”337 Thus, the Court has embraced the idea that the
“educational autonomy” of schools has “a constitutional dimension, grounded
in the First Amendment . . . .”338
However, the landscape of academic freedom has changed over the course
of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. Academic freedom still
permits schools to choose their educational mission, but does not grant schools
blind faith to conduct their own admissions procedures. Fisher makes clear
that the methods a school chooses to attain the educational benefits of diversity
are not immunized from rigorous judicial review if those means are not
narrowly tailored to the school’s objective.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is not to advocate one program over another.
Critics can find flaws in each program, but finding a workable race-neutral
alternative does not depend on designing a flawless program. This Article
raises the issue that if a school achieves racial diversity using race-neutral
means, other institutions will have the burden of showing why a similar
program would be unworkable before they can implement race-based
admissions programs. While one race-neutral program may not achieve as
much racial diversity as a race-based program, a combination of race-neutral
programs may nevertheless achieve the desired level of diversity. To follow
Fisher, narrow tailoring requires, at a minimum, that institutions consult
available resources339 and published studies. Before a school implements a
332. Id. at 603.
333. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
334. Id. at 225.
335. Id.
336. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
337. Id. at 92.
338. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
339. For example, the U.S. Department of Education published a report that details an array
of race-neutral programs employed by higher education institutions across the nation. U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18, at 5.
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race-based admissions policy, it must articulate to the court why any
combination of these race-neutral programs is unworkable.
In light of the evidence that race-neutral programs have succeeded in
attaining diversity without compromising academic performance, institutions
of higher education will be hard pressed to justify using racial admissions.
Ultimately, they may not be able to avoid the inevitable conclusion that
although diversity is important,340 race-based affirmative action in admissions
is unnecessary, at least in terms of how the Court’s strict scrutiny jurisprudence
has construed “necessary.”
Fisher’s demanding narrow tailoring analysis mandates that more schools
strive to develop innovative programs that enhance student diversity without
depending upon racial considerations. As one school has realized, “it takes
creativity, a lot of hard work, and a lot of money before an institution can hope
to achieve diversity without using affirmative action.”341 But, “it [is] worth the
cost.”342

340. Seventy-four percent of schools responding to the National Association of College
Admission Counseling’s survey indicated that they embrace diversity, as demonstrated in their
mission statements. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, DIVERSITY AND COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS IN 2003: A SURVEY REPORT 4 (2003), available at http://www.nacacnet.org/issuesaction/policy/Documents/Diversity%20Report%20Web.pdf.
341. Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21, at 23.
342. Id.

